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Abstract
We investigate the dynamic eﬀects of interregional labor market integration
on migration flows, capital formation, and the price for housing services. The
co-evolution of these variables depends on initial conditions at the time of labor
market integration. In an initially capital-poor economy, there may be a reversal
of migration flows during the transition to the steady state, while housing costs
are increasing over time. Although capital may accumulate while labor emigrates
early in the transition, the causal eﬀect of immigration on capital investments and
housing costs is positive. We present new data on the evolution of net migration
flows and rental rates for housing in East Germany after 1990. Our results are
consistent with the presented evidence in the reverse migration scenario.
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“Today, the decision was taken that makes it possible for all citizens to leave
the country through East German border crossing points. [...] As far as I know
- eﬀective immediately, without delay.”1
1 Introduction
The fall of the Berlin Wall in November of 1989 can be viewed as a quasi-natural
experiment of the eﬀects of interregional labor market integration. From one day to
the next, literally overnight, East German citizens had the opportunity to move to
West Germany (and vice versa), after the sudden removal of all institutional migration
barriers. To begin with, there were no language barriers. Moreover, there were plenty
of family ties that made migration costs, other than costs associated with finding a
new shelter, almost negligible. In other words, we have seen a historically unique case
of an exogenous integration shock from fully closed to fully open borders.
This paper examines the dynamic eﬀects of interregional labor market integration
on migration patterns, private investment, wages, and the price for housing services. In
particular, we take up the challenge to explain the mechanics of the remarkable migra-
tion pattern in East Germany for the period 1991-2014. This period is characterized
by a “reversal of migration flows”, i.e. prolonged net outward migration followed by
net inward migration later on. Fig. 1 shows the net migration flows for East Germany
(“New Laender”), excluding Berlin. To smooth out business cycle fluctuations, we take
five-year annual averages for the periods 1991-1995, 1996-2000, 2001-2005 and 2006-
2010 as well as the four-year annual average for the period 2011-14. According to Fig.
1, there was a massive outflow in the 1990s and 2000s for East Germany as a whole.2
The outflow was larger for the 1990s when leaving out the state of Brandenburg that
is special in the following sense. Many workers of Berlin-based firms are commuting
1Guenther Schabowski (First Secretary of the East Berlin chapter of the Socialist Unity Party -
SED - in the former German Democractic Republic - GDR - and a member of the SED Politbuero),
November 9, 1989. Translated from German.
2Burda (2006) also documents for the 1990s labor outflows from East Germany that were directed
to West Germany.
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Figure 1: Net migration flows (annual averages) to the New Laender (Brandenburg,
Mecklenburg-Western Pomerania, Saxony-Anhalt, Saxony, and Thuringia), 1991-2014.
Data: See Online Appendix.
to work from Brandenburg that surrounds the city of Berlin (partly having belonged
to West Germany).3 The migration pattern in the New Laender has reversed to net
inflows after 2011. As displayed in Figure 2, the reversal of migration flows is particu-
larly apparent for cities with more than 100,000 inhabitants. It has started already in
the 2000s, with the largest inflows to the two largest cities, Dresden and Leipzig. More
recently there have been positive net inflows to all East German cities.
To explain such a migration pattern, we develop a neoclassical, overlapping gener-
ations model with a tradable goods sector and a housing sector. The housing sector
combines land and residential structures, that is accumulated through construction ac-
tivities, to produce housing services.4 Firms in the tradable goods sector face capital
adjustment costs to install new physical capital. We study the eﬀects of implementing
3Associated with Berlin having become an economic and political center soon after the German
reunification, Brandenburg experienced net immigration in the mid 1990s.
4This borrows from the business-cycle literature on housing and macroeconomics (Davis and Heath-
cote, 2005; Hornstein, 2008, 2009; and Favilukis et al., 2015). Chambers et al. (2009a, 2009b) employ
an OLG model with housing and mortgage markets, excluding the fixed factor land, to explain the
evolution in homeownership rates. Grossmann and Steger (2016) develop a long-term macroeconomic
model. Piazzesi and Schneider (2016) provide an excellent survey.
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Figure 2: Net migration flows (annual averages) to cities with more than 100,000
inhabitants in the New Laender, 1991-2014. Data: See Online Appendix.
free interregional labor movement, conditional on initial diﬀerences (across regions) in
the two capital stocks (physical capital and residential structures) and on initial diﬀer-
ences in productivity levels. These interregional diﬀerences drive migration decisions
by determining diﬀerences in both wage rates and the price for housing services across
regions.
Our analysis suggests a causally positive (negative) eﬀect of immigration (emigra-
tion) on capital accumulation. Nevertheless, interregional flows of labor and regional
changes in capital stocks may transitorily evolve in opposite directions.5 We demon-
strate how initial conditions and the time that has elapsed after labor market inte-
gration determine how migration flows are related to the evolutions of capital stocks
and housing costs over time. In particular, we show that in the case of low initial pro-
ductivity levels and / or low initial capital stocks, such as in East Germany vis-à-vis
5Historically, there are examples for labor and capital to flow in the same or in opposite directions.
For instance, the Atlantic globalization in the 19th century was characterized by simultaneous capital
and labor flows from Europe to the US (e.g. O’Rourke and Williamson, 1999; Solimano and Watts,
2005). Moreover, in response to the enlargement of the European Union (EU), labor was migrating
from Southern and Eastern EU members to countries like Germany and the UK, while there were net
capital inflows in some countries with net emigration.
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West Germany at the time of the German reunification, a net outflow of migrants may
occur, in an early transition phase, despite accumulation of capital stocks. In later
phases, the migration pattern is reversed along with still positive net investments. Net
investments in physical capital and structures are indeed positive if the neoclassical
convergence force is suﬃciently strong or if productivity levels increase over time (e.g.
following technology transfers like those from the Old Laender to the New Laender).
The price for housing services is increasing as the economy develops, reflecting the
scarcity of land and the increase of wage rates over time.
Noteworthy, the suggested model can also explain, under alternative initial condi-
tions, other migration patterns, such as continuous immigration or continuous emigra-
tion in response to labor market integration. For instance, consistent with our frame-
work, there were massive net immigration flows to Switzerland (a high-productivity
economy with a high capital-to-labor ratio) along with rising prices for housing ser-
vices in the aftermath of the bilateral agreement with the European Union on the
free movement of labor.6 We focus on the German case after 1989, however, because
this historical episode was shaped by a unique experiment that allows us to better
understand the dynamic general equilibrium mechanics of migration and capital accu-
mulation in general and the reverse migration phenomenon in particular.
We also show that higher population density causally raises housing costs even in
the long run, i.e. after housing supply fully adjusted to the increase in housing demand
as a response to immigration. This finding is consistent with the evidence on causally
positive eﬀects of immigration on both the price for housing services and residential
construction (e.g. Gonzalez and Ortega, 2013).7 The reason is that the production of
6The agreement was signed in 2002 and came into full eﬀect (with respect to 17 EU countries,
excluding Eastern Europe) in 2007. The case of Switzerland is discussed in detail in the working
paper version of this paper (Grossmann, Schäfer and Steger, 2013).
7Gonzalez and Ortega (2013) employ Spanish regional data for the period 2001-2010 (characterized
by an annual population growth rate of 1.5 percent). They instrument changes in population density
by past migration stocks of the foreign-born population in a region. About half of the construction
boom in the 2000s is attributed to immigration. Saiz (2003, 2007) and Nygaard (2011) find substantial
eﬀects of immigration on rental rates and sales prices for housing in the US and UK. Jeanty et al. (2010)
estimate a two-equation spatial econometric model which captures the two-way interaction between
net migration flows and the price for housing services. Employing data from the metropolitan area of
Michigan, they find that a one percentage point increase in the rate of population growth leads to a
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housing services is land-intensive and land is a fixed factor that becomes increasingly
scarce in a growing economy. Thus, the price of housing services is closely related to
the rental rate of land (Knoll, Schularick and Steger, 2016; Grossmann and Steger,
2016).
The main contribution of the paper is twofold. First, whereas a large literature
on the dynamic eﬀects of migration was confined to either the labor market or the
housing market separately, we shift the focus to the interaction between housing costs
and wage rates over time in determining migration patterns.8 We show that a re-
versal of migration patterns can be explained by the interaction between migration,
capital investment, and construction activities. Standard neoclassical models cannot
explain the reversal of migration flows.9 While our model shares the features of capital
adjustment costs, exogenous interest rates and interregional labor mobility with the
one-sector frameworks developed in Rappaport (2005) and Burda (2006), their focus
is on wage convergence rather than on the reversal of migration flows.10 We show that
the reversal of migration flows is generated by the dynamics of residential construc-
tion and the price for housing services that we additionally examine in our two-sector
framework. Moreover, whereas non-monotonic time paths of a region’s population size
may occur in models with increasing returns to scale, our framework explains non-
monotonic transitions despite constant returns to scale.11 Second, the paper provides a
0.24 percent increase in housing costs.
8Important studies on wage eﬀects of immigration include Friedberg (2001) for Israel, Dustmann,
Fabbri, and Preston (2005) for the UK, and Borjas (2003) as well as Ottaviano and Peri (2012) for
the US.
9Felbermayr, Grossmann and Kohler (2015) provide an extensive literature survey on the interac-
tion between migration and capital formation.
10Rappaport (2005) argues that higher labor mobility that leads to an increased outflows of workers
does not necessarily increase the speed of income convergence. For a given capital stock, emigration
leads to increased wages in the source country. However, emigration also drives down the shadow value
of capital and therefore slows down capital investment. The latter eﬀect results in delayed income
convergence. Burda (2006) studies the dynamics of labor migration and capital accumulation under
factor adjustment costs. Per capita income of the East German economy fully converges to the West
German level as labor moves towards West Germany and capital accumulates in the East Germany
economy.
11Faini (1996) contrasts models of exogenous and endogenous growth, arguing that income conver-
gence is not necessarily less likely in the case of learning-by-doing eﬀects. Reichlin and Rustichini
(1998) employ an endogenous growth model with learning-by-doing eﬀects to show that immigration
enhances interregional wage diﬀerences due to a scale eﬀect, benefitting the receiving destination.
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new comprehensive data set for the New Laender in Germany at the regional (county
and state) level on net migration flows and on the rental costs of housing services
for the period after the German reunification until 2014. It is demonstrated that our
results are qualitatively consistent with the presented evidence.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the model. Section 3 pro-
vides analytical results for the long run equilibrium. In Section 4, we solve the model
numerically for the transition path to the steady state in response to labor market
integration. We demonstrate the model’s potential to explain a reversal of migration
flows and discuss the salient role of the housing sector for this outcome. Section 5
demonstrates that the suggested explanation for the reverse migration phenomenon is
also consistent with the joint evolution of housing rental rates and wage rates in East
Germany after 1990. The last section concludes.
2 The Model
Consider a simple neoclassical model economy with two sectors. The tradeable goods
sector produces a final good (the "numeraire"). The non-tradable goods sector pro-
duces housing services by combining accumulable "structures" and a fixed amount of
land. Labor can be reallocated across sectors without any frictions. There is interna-
tional mobility of physical capital at an (exogenous) interest rate   0. Labor market
integration allows individuals to move between two regions ("domestic" and "foreign").
We distinguish the cases of interregionally immobile and mobile labor, investigating the
eﬀects of labor market integration. Time is discrete and indexed by  = 0 1 2 
Moreover, migration may change the skill composition of the workforce in a way which may also bene-
fit the source economy. Schäfer and Steger (2014) emphasize how equilibrium selection and dynamics
depend on both expectations and initial conditions in a multi-region model where increasing returns
give rise to multiple equilibria.
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2.1 Domestic Economy
2.1.1 Firms
There is a tradable goods sector producing a homogenous good, which is chosen as
numeraire (i.e. output price  ≡ 1). The production technology of the representative
firm is given by
 =  · ¡ ¢ ()1−  (1)
 ∈ (0 1), where  denotes the amount of labor,  physical capital, and   0
total factor productivity (TFP) in the tradable goods sector.12 Accumulating physical
capital is subject to (convex) capital-adjustment costs (Abel, 1982; Hayashi, 1982).
Let  denote the amount of the tradable good that is devoted to gross investment in
the tradable goods sector. Taking the time path of the wage rate, , as well as the
(exogenous) interest rate, , as given, the representative firm solves
max
{   }∞=0
∞X
=0
 · ¡ ¢ ()1− −  −  h1 +  ³ ´i
(1 + ) (2)
s.t. +1 =  + (1− ), (3)
where   0 is the depreciation rate of physical capital and 0  0 is given.
The non-tradable sector produces residential structures (a non-tradable stock) and
housing services (a non-tradable flow). The representative construction firm combines
labor,  , and materials (e.g. cement),  , to manufacture gross investment in struc-
tures,  , according to
 =  ·
¡ ¢ ()1−  (4)
 ∈ (0 1), where   0 is TFP in the construction sector. Materials are produced from
the tradable good on a one-by-one basis. The stock, , depreciates at rate   0 and
12The time index  is often omitted, provided that this may not lead to confusion.
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accumulates according to
+1 =  + (1− ) (5)
=  · ¡ ¢ ()1− + (1− ), (6)
where 0  0 is given. The representative construction firm then solves
max
{  }∞=0
∞X
=0
  −  −
(1 + ) s.t. (6), (7)
taking  , , and  as given. The representative housing services firm produces a non-
tradable consumption good by combining structures and a fixed (i.e., time-invariant)
amount of land  (which equals land supply), according to
 = () 1− (8)
 ∈ (0 1).13 Denote by  the price per unit of housing services, by  the rental
rate per unit of structures, and by  the rental rate of land. Each period , the
representative housing services firm solves
max
 
¡ () 1− −   −  ¢  (9)
taking  ,  , and  as given.
2.1.2 Households
Each individual lives for two periods ("working-age" and "retirement") and has one
child when old. In the first period, each individual supplies one unit of labor when
young to the sector with the highest wage and chooses how much to save (or borrow).
Moreover, individuals decide at the beginning of the first period whether to stay or
to migrate to the large economy, seeking to maximize life-time utility. Our simple
13TFP in the housing services sector is set to unity. A higher  captures better technology in the
housing sector as a whole.
8
overlapping-generations structure allows us to focus on one-shot migration decisions of
workers. There may be (exogenous) institutional and social migration costs, denoted
as ∆ ≥ 0. We assume that a worker migrates if and only if the utility gain from
migrating is equal to or higher than ∆. As will become apparent, even if ∆ = 0 (no
exogenous migration costs) and despite persistent wage diﬀerentials, migration flows
are limited via diﬀerences in the price of housing services across regions. Migration
flows are therefore smoothed endogenously along with adjustments in the stocks of
physical capital and residential structures.
The number of workers (i.e. the number of young individuals) in period  is denoted
by . Thus, total population size in period  is given by  + −1. The number of
initially old natives, −1  0, is given. As each period the same number of individuals
is born,  = −1 for all  ≥ 0 if labor is not interregionally mobile. The population
density is given by  ≡ (+−1), where −1  0 is given. Labor market clearing
requires
 +  =  (10)
Initially land is fully owned by the −1 old natives, where () denotes the landhold-
ing of individual . Landowners bequeath their landholding to their child when leaving
the scene, such that the number of landowners and the land distribution among natives
is time-invariant. For simplicity, we assume that firms in the non-tradable goods sector
are owned by foreigners. In period , a young individual  who stays in the domestic
economy thus has a present discounted value of life-time income, (), which is given
by
() =  + 

+1
1 + () (11)
For the sake of realism, suppose that a non-negligible fraction of natives is landless (for
a landless individual , () = 0).
Let 1 and 1 denote the amount of tradable goods and housing services consumed
by a working-age individual born in , respectively. Analogously, 2+1 and 2+1 are
consumption levels during retirement. Life-time utility of an individual born in period
9
 is given by14
() = (1() 1()) +  · (2+1() 2+1()) (12)
 ∈ (0 1), with instantaneous utility function ( ) = ·log +(1−)·log ,  ∈ (0 1).
Recalling that  = 1, the intertemporal budget constraint of consumer  reads as
1() +  1() + 2+1() + 

+12+1()
1 +  ≤(). (13)
We assume that the time discount rate is given by the standard condition
 · (1 + ) = 1 (14)
2.2 Foreign Economy
The foreign economy is in steady state and large in the sense that migration from or
towards the domestic economy has no eﬀect on its population density. The popula-
tion density, denoted by ∗(= ∗∗), is therefore time-invariant. TFP levels in the
tradable goods sector of the foreign economy, ∗, and in the housing sector, ∗, may
diﬀer from the domestic levels,  and , respectively. Apart from productivity levels,
population density, and initial conditions, the domestic and the foreign economy are
identical.
3 Equilibrium Analysis
As shown in the appendix, individual  has life-time utility
 (()   +1) ≡ max1()1()2+1()2+1()() s.t. (13) (15)
= Ω+ (1 + ) log()− (1− ) £log  +  log +1¤  (16)
14This preference specification can be viewed as a dynamic extension of the static model of locational
choice by Roback (1982), who argues that diﬀerences in wage income across regions can be explained
by diﬀerent amenities associated with the chosen location, also endogenizing the rental rate of land.
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with Ω ≡ (1 + ) log
³
(1−)1−
1+
´
. Let ∗ denote the wage rate and ∗ the price for
housing services in the foreign economy. Moreover, define by V ≡  (   +1) and
V∗ ≡  (∗ ∗ ∗) the life-time utility (in equilibrium) of a landless native in the
domestic and foreign economy, respectively. If labor is interregionally mobile, landless
domestic residents born in  do not want to migrate to the foreign economy as long as
V ≥ V∗ +∆. Similarly, landless foreign residents born in  do not want to migrate to
the domestic economy as long as V+∆ ≤ V∗. If∆  0, there is the possibility that, for
a given set of parameters, a multiplicity of equilibria  = −1 (no migration) exists
whenever |V − V∗| ≤ ∆ (indeterminacy of equilibrium).15 To avoid such diﬃculty and
to capture the absence of institutional migration costs within Germany after the fall of
the Berlin Wall, we follow Roback (1982) and abstract from exogenous migration costs
in the remainder of this paper, assuming ∆ = 0. We focus on equilibria where landless
individuals are indiﬀerent whether or not to migrate under integrated labor markets,
such that
V = V∗ for any  ≥ 1 (17)
If ∆ = 0, a domestic native  born in  with land holding () does not want to
migrate to the foreign economy if
 ( +  · +1()   +1)   (∗ +  · +1() ∗ ∗) (18)
Using (16) in (18), the incentive-compatibility constraint for a domestic native  born
in  with land holding () to remain in the domestic region reads
1 + 
1−  log
µ +  · +1 · ()
∗ +  · +1 · ()
¶
 log
µ 
∗
¶
+  · log
µ+1
∗
¶
 (19)
Notice that for   0, we have +· ·∗+· ·  () ∗ if   ()∗. Thus, if   ∗
and  =  ∗ holds, a land-owning domestic native does not want to migrate to the
15Armenter and Ortega (2011) employ a static multi-regions model with skilled and unskilled workers
under endogenous redistribution and mobility costs. In their setup, redistribution and mobility costs
aﬀect the incentives for skilled workers to migrate. Interestingly, they obtain multiple equilibria if
migration costs are relatively low.
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foreign economy, as the incentive-compatibility constraint (19) is satisfied. In contrast,
if   ∗ and V = V∗ holds in equilibrium, a land-owning foreign native does not
want to migrate to the domestic economy. In other words, when landless individuals
are indiﬀerent in equilibrium whether or not to migrate, triggered oﬀ by emigration of
some landless individuals motivated by gaining wage income, no landowner wants to
migrate.16 The intuition why the incentive to migrate is higher for landless individuals
is as follows. Because land rents are received from the home region irrespective of
the location decision, income-related migration benefits come from wage diﬀerentials
only. As the marginal utility from consumption is declining, wage gains from migration
matter more for landless individuals.
3.1 Interregionally Immobile Labor
It turns out that, for all , the equilibrium levels of all factor inputs per unit of land,
 ≡  ,  ≡  ,  ≡,  ≡ ,  ≡ , are independent of total
land supply . Before entering the numerical analysis in Section 4, we characterize the
long-run equilibrium analytically. Denote the long-run equilibrium value before labor
market integration of any variable  by ˜. All proofs are relegated to the Appendix.
Proposition 1. In an interior long run equilibrium before labor market integration,
(i) an increase in population density, , raises factor inputs ˜, ˜ , ˜, ˜, ˜, the
price of housing services, ˜, and the rental rate of land, ˜, whereas the wage rate,
˜, and the price of structures, ˜, do not depend on ;
(ii) an increase in the tradable goods sector’s TFP level, , raises capital inputs ˜,
˜, as well as the input of materials, ˜, the price of housing services, ˜, the rental
rate of land, ˜, the wage rate, ˜, and the price of structures, ˜ , whereas labor inputs
˜, ˜ remain unaﬀected;
16Conversely, if landless individuals are indiﬀerent whether or not to migrate although wages are
higher in the region of birth (but the price of housing services is so low that some landless individuals
migrate anyway), all landowners migrate. Although this is a theoretical possibility, wages in East
Germany were lower than in West Germany for the entire post-reunification period. Thus, we will not
consider this case.
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(iii) an increase in the non-tradable goods sector’s TFP level, , raises ˜, lowers
both the price of housing services, ˜, and the price of structures, ˜, while the rental
rate of land, ˜, the wage rate, ˜, and inputs ˜, ˜ , ˜, ˜ remain unaﬀected.
An increase in population density  leads to higher employment in both sectors,
in turn stimulating investments in both physical capital and structures. The long run
price of housing services, ˜ , is increasing in  despite a higher stock of residential
structures. The result reflects a dilution eﬀect of higher population density with respect
to the fixed factor (land) when producing housing services, associated with an increase
in the long run rental rate of land, ˜ .17
In the absence of labor mobility, the allocation of labor is independent of productiv-
ity parameters,  and . Higher productivity in the tradable goods sector, , means
higher output of the tradable good for given inputs, and thus a higher relative price
of housing services,  . Consequently, it spurs accumulation of both physical capital
and structures. A higher  is positively associated with a higher rental rate of land,
, and a higher value of the marginal product of labor in the housing sector. This
explains why both the long run wage rate, ˜, and the long run price of structures, ˜ ,
are increasing in . Because of lower demand for housing services associated with a
higher ˜ , the long run allocation of labor across sectors is independent of .
Higher productivity in the housing sector, , leads to higher supply of structures,
thus being negatively associated with the price for housing services,  . At the same
time, an increase in  means that the marginal product of inputs in the housing sector
is higher for a given  . This explains why physical capital formation, the rental rate
of land and the wage rate are independent of  in the long run.
17These comparative-static results have interesting welfare implications. If and only if the land
estate of an individual is suﬃciently high, the positive welfare eﬀect of immigration via higher income
from land ownership dominates the negative welfare eﬀect of an increase in housing costs. Thus, there
is a threshold amount of landholding, ¯  0, such that all individuals with ()  ¯ win from labor
market integration, whereas those with ()  ¯ lose. If there is emigration, the result is reversed.
These insights give potentially rise to polarization of attitudes towards immigration in a heterogenous
population, similar to the political economy perspective of Benhabib (1996). In Benhabib (1996),
individuals diﬀer along capital holdings and develop diﬀerent attitudes depending on the fact whether
the capital-labor ratio rises or falls in response to immigration.
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3.2 Integrated Labor Markets
Denote the long run equilibrium value after labor market integration of any variable 
by ˆ.
Proposition 2. Under integrated labor markets, the long run equilibrium popula-
tion density, ˆ, is proportional to the foreign population density, ∗, and increases in
the relative productivity level across regions in both sectors, ∗ and ∗.
The higher the foreign population density, ∗, the higher is the (long run) price of
housing services in the foreign economy, ∗, reducing its attractiveness. This explains
why more individuals want to live in the domestic economy. An increase in the relative
productivity across regions of the tradable goods sector, ∗, has two counteracting
eﬀects on the steady state population density of the domestic economy when labor
is interregionally mobile. First, before labor market integration, an increase in ∗
raises the long run wage rate of individuals in the domestic relative to the foreign
economy, ˜∗ (part (ii) of Proposition 1) such that the domestic economy becomes
more attractive for workers. Second, for a given population density, it also raises the
long run price for housing services in the domestic region relative to the foreign region,
˜∗, lowering the attractiveness of the domestic economy. With respect to long
population density in response to labor market integration, the first eﬀect dominates
the second one. Moreover, an increase in the relative productivity of the non-tradable
goods sector, ∗, has no eﬀect on ˜∗ (part (iii) of Proposition 1), but lowers
˜∗ for given labor inputs, making the domestic economy more attractive.
4 Numerical Analysis
We now turn to numerical analysis in order to investigate the role of initial conditions
and the evolution of TFP for the evolution of migration flows in response to labor
market integration. In addition, we focus on the dynamic interaction of migration flows
on the one hand and the evolution of the wage rate, the price for housing services, the
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formation of physical capital and structures on the other hand. We will argue that the
model can explain migration outflows and positive net investments in both physical
capital and structures at the same time, while the causal eﬀect of higher migration
inflows on investments is positive. Most importantly, we will show that migration
flows can be reversed over time if the integration shock happens in a capital-poor
economy (possibly also characterized by low TFP levels), such as in East Germany
shortly after the fall of the iron curtain.
4.1 Calibration
We shall emphasize that, despite implementing a reasonable model calibration, our
goal is to characterize transitional dynamics qualitatively rather than quantitatively.
On the one hand, for a quantitative analysis, our two-period overlapping-generations
structure is too stylized. On the other hand, the simplicity allows us to gain solid
intuitions into the underlying economic mechanisms.
Assuming an annual real interest rate of 2 percent and a length of a generation
of about 35 years suggests that  = 1; thus  = 05, according to (14). Empirical
evidence points to a budget share on housing of about one third (e.g. Johnson, Rogers
and Tan, 2001), which suggests  = 23. Moreover, we set  = 025 and  = 05
which reflects an annual depreciation rate of about two percent in the housing sector
and four percent in the tradable goods sector, respectively.
We also employ the standard quadratic specification of capital adjustment costs,
which means that we set  = 1. In addition, we assume  = 05 which implies that, in
a steady state with  =  = 05, one unit of gross investment in physical capital
requires 1 +  · ¡¢ = 125 units of the tradable good.
Since all quantities can be expressed relative to land endowment , we set  = 1
without loss of generality. For output elasticities in the housing sector, we set  =  =
05. Finally, we normalize the foreign (exogenous) population density to ∗ = 1.
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4.2 Labor Market Integration Eﬀects
The dynamic eﬀects of labor market integration on the labor force, wage rate and the
price for housing services are visualized, whereas for the sake of brevity we display the
evolution of the other variables in the Online Appendix. We focus on the case that
captures the initial conditions of East Germany at the time of the re-unification with
West Germany. Suppose that initial stocks of both physical capital and structures are
below the long run values under labor market integration, i.e., 0  ˜, 0  ˜.
Moreover, the domestic TFP levels at  = 0 do not exceed the foreign TFP level,
i.e., 0 ≤ ∗ and 0 ≤ ∗. To isolate diﬀerent eﬀects, the first experiment (Fig. 3
below) assumes time-invariant TFP parameters that are equal to the foreign economy.
The second experiment (Fig. 4 below) then allows for time-dependent TFP levels that
start below the foreign levels: 0  ∗ and 0  ∗. This constellation represents
a plausible description of East Germany vis-à-vis West Germany (or, more generally,
Eastern Europe vis-à-vis Western and Northern Europe) at the time of the fall of the
iron curtain.18
First, in order to illustrate the implications of low initial capital stocks in isolation,
Fig. 3 displays the transitional dynamics for the case where  = ∗ and  = ∗ for
all . Because TFP is the same as in the foreign economy, steady states coincide with
the domestic economy. Moreover, steady state values before and after labor market
integration are the same. That is, ˜ = ˆ = ∗, ˜ = ˆ = ∗, ˆ = ∗ = −1 = ˜,
˜ = ˆ = ∗, ˜ = ˆ = ∗. The dotted lines show the transitional dynamics that
occur without integrated labor markets, whereas the solid lines illustrate transitional
dynamics when the labor market is opened up at time  = 0. Because the economy is
initially capital-poor (0  ˜, 0  ˜), the initial wage rate is lower than the foreign
level in the closed economy (0  ∗). In response to labor market integration, this
triggers oﬀ emigration on impact (0  −1), associated with a drop in sectoral labor
inputs,  and  (see Online Appendix), and an associated increase in the wage rate,
18We ignore the eﬀects that come from initially diﬀerent population densities, assuming it is the
same in the domestic economy as abroad (−1 = ∗ = 1).
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Figure 3: Transitional dynamics for an initially capital-poor economy assuming labor
market integration at  = 0 (solid lines) and assuming that labor markets remain
closed (dotted lines). Parameter configuration:  = ∗ =  = ∗ = 5, 0 = 08˜,
0 = 08˜.
, compared to the pre-integration case. In the displayed numerical example, there
is emigration despite the price for housing being initially lower than in the foreign
economy. The property 0  ∗ arises because the stock of structures is low, implying
that the marginal product of land in the production of housing services is low. Notably,
despite emigration, there is accumulation of both physical capital, , and structures,
, reflecting the standard neoclassical convergence force (Rappaport, 2005). Because
emigration reduces the investment incentives compared to the pre-integration case,
both types of capital accumulate more slowly than in the pre-integration case, as
displayed in the Online Appendix. That is, the causal eﬀect of emigration is to lower
investment in both sectors. Over time, and after the initial drop of population density,
the size of the workforce rises along with accumulation of physical capital and structures
from  = 1 onwards. This is the reverse migration phenomenon we observe in East
Germany, according to Fig. 1 and 2, particularly in cities that are the economically
most active regions. The price of housing services,  , is lower on impact than it
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would be in the closed economy because of emigration. It then rises over time because
of increased demand for housing that is associated with increasing wages and (for the
solid line) the reversal of the migration flows to immigration. The transition to the
steady state level ˆ is slower than without labor market integration, where the labor
force is higher.
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Figure 4: Transitional dynamics for an economy that initially is capital-poor and
has low TFP levels assuming labor market integration at  = 0 (solid lines) and as-
suming that labor markets remain closed (dotted lines). Parameter configuration:
0 = 096∗ = 48, 0 = 096∗ = 48, 0 = 055˜, 0 = 085˜.  and  increase
according to a logistic function to 100 percent of the foreign TFP level only for the
case of labor market integration (solid lines).
The experiment displayed in Fig. 4 not only assumes that initial state variables
start below the pre-integration steady state values (0 = 055˜ and 0 = 085˜). It
also assumes that domestic TFP parameters start below the foreign levels (0 = 096∗
and 0 = 096∗). These border conditions capture the economic fundamentals of the
East German economy at the time of the reunification most accurately. For the long
run, we assume that TFP levels converge gradually to 100 percent of the foreign level
(lim→∞ = ∗ and lim→∞ = ∗). Increasing TFP levels over time are certainly
plausible for the post-reunification transition in East Germany because of technology
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transfers and institutional improvements from advanced economies to East Germany
(particularly from West German firms that opened plants in the New Laender after
1990). Physical capital and structures decumulate for a while shortly after labor market
integration, whereas the stocks accumulate in the pre-integration case (as displayed in
the Online Appendix) due to a standard neoclassical convergence mechanism. When
TFP levels become suﬃciently high, there is again a reversal of migration flows in
parallel with rising wage rates, a rising price for housing services, and rising capital
stocks.
Only if TFP levels remain suﬃciently low also in the long run, it is possible that
˜  0  ˆ and ˜  0  ˆ. In this case, emigration and decumulation of
capital occurs at the same time and there is no reverse migration. In the case of East
Germany, however, there was technology transfer from advanced regions, foremostWest
Germany, along with capital accumulation. Hence, the premises underlying Fig. 4 are
more plausible.
4.3 Reverse Migration: The Role of the Housing Sector
In a one-sector model, with the tradable goods sector only (i.e.  = 1), the no-arbitrage
condition V = V∗ that makes workers indiﬀerent between migrating and staying in an
integrated labor market boils down to wage rate equalization,  = ∗. As the wage
rate equals the marginal product of labor, it holds that·()1− = ∗·(∗∗)1−.
Suppose again that labor markets integrate in period  = 0. Also suppose that, one
period in advance (in  = −1), we have  · (−1−1)1−  ∗ · (∗∗)1−. Then,
in  = 0, the capital stock remains at the previous level at all times and labor moves
out with constant population thereafter. Formally, for all  ≥ 0, we have  = −1,
sustained by gross investment  = −1, and  = (∗) 11−−1∗∗  −1.
In other words, the economy − that may have been on a transition path with gradual
capital accumulation before labor markets integrate − jumps into the steady state
by adjusting the amount of workers through emigration at the time of labor markets
integration. This is similar to the case in Burda (2006). A reversal of migration flows
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over time cannot occur.
In the one-sector model of Rappaport (2005), there are exogenous limits to labor
force adjustments each period such that emigration is stretched over time until wage
rates have converged. A reversal of migration flows cannot occur either.
Reverse migration occurs in our model because of the presence of the housing sector.
In the case where housing costs are lower in the domestic economy (as in Fig. 3 and
4), emigration early in the transition in response to labor market integration does not
occur to a point where the domestic wage rate rises to the foreign level, despite the
absence of exogenous migration costs.
5 Empirical Evidence: The Case of East Germany
In this section, we argue that the reverse migration scenario displayed in Fig. 3 and 4
is consistent with the evidence on net migration flows, the evolution of wages and the
evolution of housing costs in the New German Laender after the fall of the Berlin Wall.
Details on the data construction and robustness checks are relegated to the Online
Appendix.
5.1 Net Migration Flows
Fig. 1 and 2 in the introduction are based on a new data set on net migration flows
for the period 1991-2014 at the district level in East Germany. So far, the data were
not publicly available for any district in the New Laender before 1995 and were also
not available for most districts after 2007.19
The migration data set used for Fig. 1 and Fig. 2 is based on net migration balances,
accounting for movements across the borders of administrative districts (NUTS 3 units
in the EUROSTAT typology for all five New Laender in Germany). The districts in
the New Laender were subject to numerous border reforms between 1991 and 2014,
19The reason for this limited data availability up to now were subsequent changes in county borders
resulting from administrative reforms. We worked with the Statistical Oﬃces of the New Laender to
complete the data set. Their collaboration with us is gratefully acknowledged.
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reducing their number considerably. To get consistent data over the entire period
1991 to 2014, one territorial status was chosen and reconstructed for the periods with
diﬀering district borders. The longest period not marked by significant territorial
reforms lasted from 1995 to 2006. Thus, we selected the territorial boundaries during
that period of time. For the periods before (1991-1994) and after the reference period
(2007-2014), the municipalities (corresponding to LAU2 units) were assigned to the
districts to whom they belonged during the reference period and their net migration
balances were added up to reconstruct the data at the district-level.
To sum up the discussion in the introduction, we see a reversal of migration flows
particularly in East German cities. Fig. 4 based on the theoretical model suggests
that outflows are highest early in the transition, whereas Fig. 1 and 2 shows that
migration outflows was higher in the second half than in the first of the 1990s. This
may not only reflect a kind of behavioral inertia of workers, especially in more rural
areas (Burda, 1993), but may also reflect massive public investment in the early 1990s
in East Germany ("Aufbau Ost"), as discussed in OECD (2001). Overall, Fig. 3 and
4 are consistent with the evidence on the decline in emigration flows and an eventual
reversal to net inflows.
5.2 Wages
Fig. 3 and 4 also suggest that the reverse migration pattern is associated with gradual
increases in both wage rates and rental rates of housing that are pronounced in the
early transition phase. According to Fig. 5, the average wage income per worker in all
the New Laender shows incomplete convergence to the West German level.
Wages increased particularly fast in the 1990s. Not all of that was market-driven,
as trade unions pushed to harmonize wages in Germany. This was associated with
comparatively high unemployment rates in East Germany. Consistent with the theo-
retical considerations, however, wages in the Eastern Laender relative to the Western
German wage level continued to increase (along with a decline in unemployment rates)
in the 2000s as well, suggesting that TFP levels do not yet coincide.
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Figure 5: Real wage income per worker relative to West Germany (without Berlin) in
the New Laender, 1991-2014. Data: Federal Ministry of Finance, Germany.
5.3 Rental Rates for Housing
Finally, we relate the evolution of rental rates for housing over time in the New Laender
to our model, by constructing a comprehensive data set on rental housing in East
Germany that has not yet been used elsewhere (forWest Germany, see Fitzenberger and
Fuchs, 2016). The data on housing costs come from the German Socio-Economic Panel
Study (SOEP), a representative annual household panel survey that oﬀers detailed
information on rental housing from the perspective of tenants. The final data set
consists of 107,514 private households who live in rental apartments between 1984 and
2014 in West Germany and 34,248 private households who live in rental apartments
between 1990 and 2014 in East Germany.
Fig. 6 visualizes the evolution of the "raw" average monthly rental payments per
square metre for East Germany (since 1990) and West Germany (since 1984) over time,
employing the full sample. While West German rental rates show no trend since the
early 1990s (consistent with a steady state), the price for housing services increased
fast in East Germany in the 1990s. In the 2000s it was six times as high as in 1990.
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Figure 6: Evolution of raw average rental payments per square meter per month in
East Germany vs. West Germany. Note: Index with the average rent in East Germany
in year 1990 as basis value (= 100). Data: German Socio-Economic Panel (SOEP),
version 31.
As for wages, we observe incomplete convergence to West German levels.20
Fig. 7 shows the evolution of average rental payments per square metre for the
New Laender (including East Berlin) based on a standard hedonic pricing model that
accounts for variation in apartment quality. We control for the year of construction,
the type of location area (new residential, old residential, mixed or other), the general
apartment condition, and whether the apartment is equipped with a garden, a bal-
cony/terrace, central heating and a basement. Because of the panel structure of the
data, we are also able to control for fixed eﬀects at the apartment level.21 Comparing
Fig. 7 to Fig. 6 shows that the evolution of quality-adjusted housing costs is similar
20The speed of the increase in the 1990s was certainly slowed down by regulations that limited
upward rent adjustments, especially but not exclusively for those already living in the same apartment
before October 1990 (Neumann and Schaper, 2008). These special regulations ended in January 1998
after which the regulations coincided with those in West Germany (i.e. rental rates for housing must
not exceed a certain percentage of the local average for comparable apartments).
21The Online Appendix describes the underlying estimation procedure and the data in detail. We
also present further results that demonstrate robustness.
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Figure 7: Evolution of quality-adjusted average rental payments per square meter in
the New Laender. Note: Index with the average rent in East Germany in year 1990 as
basis value (= 100). Data: German Socio-Economic Panel (SOEP), version 31.
to the raw average in East Germany in Fig. 6 across all New Laender (including East
Berlin).
The evolution of  in Fig. 3 and 4, based on the reverse migration case of the
theoretical model, is qualitatively consistent with Fig. 6 and 7, particularly for the
1990s where we see gradual increases in rental rates for East Germany. The reason
why rental rates have been rather flat during the 2000s (while the theoretical model
would predict further increases) may be rooted in new rental price regulation policy,
beside slow economic growth in Germany as a whole during the 2000s. In a study for
the Old Laender, Fitzenberger and Fuchs (2016) show that the tenancy law reform act
in 2001 reduced apartment rents significantly for new leases. The negative reform eﬀect
diminishes with the duration of a tenancy. Thus, households who live in tenancies that
are aﬀected by the reform benefit less from being sitting tenants than households in
tenancies that started before September 2001. However, there are also regulations that
limit rental rate increases for sitting tenants in Germany. These regulations may have
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contributed to slow growth of rental rates after 2001 for reasons that are not captured
in our simple theoretical model.
6 Conclusion
This paper has examined the impact of labor market integration on migration, capital
formation, wages, the rental rate of land, and the price for housing services in an
intertemporal model with a tradable goods sector and a housing sector. Our framework
is capable to explain the phenomenon of reverse migration patterns that, for instance,
occurred in (urban) East Germany in the aftermath of the sudden fall of the iron
curtain (and the Berlin wall) in 1989. The reverse migration scenario is driven by low
initial capital stocks and possibly also by low productivity levels that are increasing
over time. The mechanism which acts as a drag on migration flows and prevents
that everyone moves to high-income regions, once this is legally made feasible, works
through the relative price of housing across regions. Once labor productivity is rising
over time, the migration flow may reverse despite the co-evolution of rising housing
costs. According to the best of our knowledge, previous studies based on neoclassical
models were unable to explain that labor market integration may lead to labor outflows
in early phases and immigration in later phases of the transition to the new long
run equilibrium. The reverse migration scenario has suggested an evolution of wages
and rental rates of housing that is consistent with the evidence for post-unification
East Germany, exploiting the unique case of complete labor market integration and
institutional harmonization across regions.
More generally, we have examined how initial conditions (i.e. initial levels of popu-
lation density, productivity levels, and capital stocks) aﬀect the direction of migration
flows over time along with other key variables. We have demonstrated that capital
inflows and emigration can occur at the same time, leading to a reversal of migration
flows in the aftermath. Our analysis also suggests that, nevertheless, the causal eﬀect of
immigration on capital investments, the land price and housing costs is unambiguously
positive. It is thus useful for empirical analyses of the interaction between migration,
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the price for housing services, and residential capital investment by helping to address
potential endogeneity biases.22
Future research may exploit our setup to study the political economy side of mi-
gration policy.23 Heterogeneity in the ownership of land may be important for distrib-
utional consequences in response to labor market integration, caused by changes in the
rental rate of land and housing costs. This may help to understand political debates
on and resistance to immigration even when migration inflows have negligible eﬀects
on the domestic labor market.24
Appendix
Derivation of (16). We omit household index  and solve the household’s problem in
two steps. In the first step, the intertemporal consumption problem is solved. Define a
Cobb-Douglas consumption index, C := 1− such that instantaneous utility is given
by log C. Consumption expenditure in a given period can be expressed as
 · C = +  (20)
where  denotes an appropriately defined price index (see below). Life-time utility of
an individual born in  reads as  = log C1 +  log C2+1.
For later use, we also allow for second-period income. Denote income of an indi-
22Empirical studies have emphasized the role of wage diﬀerences across regions (e.g. Grogger and
Hanson, 2011) and the role of migrant networks (Beine, Docquier and Ozden, 2011) for migration
flows. We emphasize the need to account for diﬀerences in housing costs as well.
23See e.g. Benhabib (1906) for an important study based on heterogeneity of capital holdings of both
natives and immigrants. De la Croix and Docquier (2014) propose a very interesting recent political
economy perspective of a host country. In their model, higher immigration in a single country does not
raise welfare from a nationalist point of view whereas a coordinated increase in immigration quotas
of a group of rich countries may lead to a Pareto improvement under an appropriate tax-subsidy
scheme. In our set up, the challenge would be to achieve a Pareto improvement within a region when
immigration produces winners and losers.
24Switzerland would be a prime example. In a widely discussed referendum on February 9, 2014,
Switzerland voted for restricting immigration by opting out of its bilateral agreement with the Euro-
pean Union on the free movement of labor (with a 50.3 percent majority). This was seen as remarkable
by commentators, as labor market eﬀects were largely invisible despite massive immigration since the
agreement came into full eﬀect in 2007. However, the main discussion in Switzerland centered on
rising prices for housing services.
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vidual born in  in the first and second period of life by 1 and 2+1, respectively.
Moreover, define
 ≡ 1 + 2+1
1 +   (21)
First-period income is equal to the wage rate, 1 = . Let  denote individual
savings in working age at time , i.e.  :=  − 1C1. We have
C1 =  − 1  (22)
C2+1 = (1 + ) + 2+12+1  (23)
The intertemporal problem may be expressed as follows:
max

{log ( − )− log (1) +  log [(1 + ) + 2+1]−  log (2+1)}  (24)
The first-order condition with respect to savings implies
1C1 = 1
1 +  (25)
2+1C2+1
1 +  =

1 +  (26)
In the second step, we analyze the static problems. Given the amount of first-period
consumption expenditure in (25), the household solves
max
11
log
£
(1) (1)1−¤ s.t. 1
1 +  = 1 + 

 1 (27)
Hence,
1 = 
1− 

 1 (28)
which combined with the first-period budget constraint in (27) implies
1 = 
1 +  1 =
1− 
1 + 

  (29)
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Similarly, given the amount of second-period consumption expenditures in (26), the
household solves
max
2+12+1
log
£
(2+1) (2+1)1−¤ s.t.  (1 + )
1 +   = 2+1 + 

+12+1 (30)
Hence, we get
2+1 = 
1− 

+12+1 (31)
which combined with (1 + )  = 1 and the second-period budget constraint in (30)
leads to
2+1 = 
1 +  2+1 =
1− 
1 + 

+1  (32)
Inserting (29) and (32) into the intertemporal utility function (12) confirms (16). It
remains to be shown that there exists a price index as used above. Using  = 1−,
the price index  may be expressed as
 = + 

C =
³ 

´1−
+ 
µ

¶
 (33)
Noting that  =

1− one gets
 = ¡¢1− "µ 
1− 
¶1−
+
µ
1− 

¶#
 (34)
This concludes the proof. ¥
Proof of Proposition 1. Denote by  the shadow price of physical capital
in numeraire sector, i.e. the multiplier to capital accumulation constraint (3) in the
profit maximization problem (2) of firms in the numeraire goods sector. The associated
Lagrangian function is given by
L ≡
∞X
=0
µ
1
1 + 
¶ ¡ · ¡ ¢ ()1− −  −

∙
1 + 
µ

¶¸
+  ·
£ + ¡1− ¢ −+1¤¶  (35)
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The associated first-order conditions L


= L


= L

+1 = 0 imply
 · ·
µ

¶1−
=  (36)

 =
µ  − 1
( + 1) 
¶ 1  (37)
(1− )+1 + (1− ) · ·
µ+1
+1
¶
+ 
µ +1
+1
¶+1
= (1 + )  (38)
According to (9), we have the following first-order conditions of the representative
housing services firm:

µ

¶−1
=   (39)

 =
µ 
(1− )
¶ 1  (40)
Combining (39) and (40) yields
 = ( ) 1
µ
1− 

¶1−
(41)
Denote by  the shadow price of structures, i.e. the multiplier to constraint (6) in
the profit maximization problem (7) of construction firms. The associated Lagrangian
function is given by
L ≡
∞X
=0
µ
1
1 + 
¶ ¡  −  −+
 ·
h
 ¡ ¢ ()1− + ¡1− ¢ −+1i´  (42)
The associated first-order conditions L


= L

 =
L
+1 = 0 imply
 ·  · ·
µ

¶−1
=  (43)
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 = 1 · (1− )
µ

¶
 (44)
+1 + (1− )+1 = (1 + )  (45)
Combining (43) with (44) and using (36) implies
 · ·
µ

¶1−
=

1− 

  (46)
Combining (44) with (45) and using (41) implies
 · (1− ) (+1) 1
µ
1− 
+1
¶ 1−
+ (1− )
µ+1
+1
¶
= (1 + )
µ

¶
 (47)
Combining and (37) with (38) leads to
(1− )+1 + (1− ) · ·
µ+1
+1
¶
+

 1
µ+1 − 1
 + 1
¶+1
= (1 + )  (48)
Combining (3) and (37) we can write
+1
 =
µ  − 1
( + 1) 
¶ 1
+ 1−   (49)
The market clearing condition for non-tradables reads as
 =
Z 
0
1()di +
Z −1
0
2()di (50)
According to (29), (32) and (11), demand for the non-tradable good of a young and an
old individual  in period , with landholding () in the second period of life, is
1() = 1− 
1 + 
 + +1()
  2() =
1− 
1 + 
−1 +  ()
  (51)
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respectively, where we used (14). Substituting (51) into (50) and using (8) yields
µ

¶
=
1− 
1 + 
  + −1−1 + (+1 +  )
  (52)
Using (40) in (52) leads to
 = (1− ) (1− )1 + 
∙
 + −1
−1
 +  · (

+1 +  )
¸
 (53)
Recall notation  = ,  =  ,  =,  =  and  = . Also
let  ≡ . Prior to labor market integration, for a given sequence of cohort sizes per
unit of land, {}∞=−1, the sequences of quantities {     +1 +1}∞=0 and prices
{      }∞=0 are given by
+1 =  ¡ ¢ ()1− + (1− ). (54)
 +  =  (55)
+1
 =
µ  − 1
( + 1) 
¶ 1
+ 1−   (56)
 =  · ·
µ

¶1−
 (57)
 =
µ 
(1− )
¶ 1  (58)
 · (1− ) (+1) 1
µ
1− 
+1
¶ 1−
+ (1− )
µ+1
+1
¶
= (1 + )
µ

¶
 (59)
(1− )+1 + (1− ) · ·
µ +1
+1
¶
+

 1
µ+1 − 1
 + 1
¶+1
= (1 + )  (60)
 = (1− ) (1− )1 + 
£ + −1−1 + (+1 +  )¤  (61)
 · ·
µ

¶1−
=

1− 

  (62)
according to (6), (10), (49), (36), (40) (47), (48), (53), (46), respectively. The solutions
31
then give us the sequence { }∞=0 according to (41) and, using (44), the sequence
{ }∞=0 according to
 = 1 · (1− )
µ

¶
 (63)
In long-run equilibrium, the values of quantities {      } and prices {
        } are time-invariant. According to (56), we obtain the long run
shadow values of physical capital as
˜ = 1 +  ( + 1) ¡¢  (64)
Using (64) in (60) gives us
˜
˜ =
Ã
(1− ) ·
 +  +  ( + 1) ¡¢ +  ¡¢+1
! 1
 (65)
Let us define
Ω ≡ 
Ã
1− 
 +  +  ( + 1) ¡¢ +  ¡¢+1
!1−
 (66)
Substituting (65) into (57) leads to
˜ = Ω · 1  (67)
Substituting (65) into (46) we obtain
˜
˜ =
1− 
 Ω ·
1
  (68)
Using (68) in (63), we find
˜ = − (1− )−(1−)Ω · 


  (69)
Without labor mobility,  =  = −1 for all  = −1 0 1  is given and popula-
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tion density reads as  = 2. Substituting (67) into (61), we obtain the long run rental
rate of land as
˜ = (1− ) (1− )
1 + − 2 (1− ) (1− )Ω ·
1
 · (70)
Using (68) and (70) into (59), in long run equilibrium,
˜ =
Ã
 + 
 (1− )1− ·
! µ
(1− ) ·
1 + − 2 (1− ) (1− )
¶1−
Ω1−(1−) · 1−(1−) 
(71)
Using (70) and (71) in (41), we obtain
˜ = ¡ + ¢− (1− )−(1−)Ω ·    (72)
Using (70) and (71) in (58), we obtain
˜ = 
 (1− )1−  (1− )
1 + − 2 (1− ) (1− )
Ω1−
 +  ·
1−
 · · (73)
Moreover, according to (54) and (68),
˜ = 
 ˜

³
1−
 Ω · 1
´1− =  (1− )1 + − 2 (1− ) (1− )  +  · (74)
where the latter follows after substituting (73).25 Substituting (74) into (55), we find
˜ =  − ˜ =
µ
1− 2 (1− )
1 + − 2 (1− ) (1− )

 + 
¶
· 
2
 (75)
With these expressions, it is easy to confirm comparative-static results. ¥
Proof of Proposition 2. With integrated labor markets, recalling ∆ = 0, equi-
25For an interior long run equilibrium to exist, it must hold that ˜(2)  , i.e.
 (1− )
1 + − 2 (1− ) (1− )

 + 
 1
2

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librium condition (17) that governs migration holds, i.e.,
log
³
∗
´
= (1− ) ·
log
³

∗
´
+  log
³
+1
∗
´
1 +   (76)
according to (16), where ∗ and ∗ are the wage rate and price for housing services in
the foreign economy. Since the foreign economy is in steady state by assumption and
diﬀers from the domestic economy in productivity parameters (∗ ∗) and population
density ∗ only. Thus, according to (67) and (71), we have
˜
∗ =
µ 
∗
¶ 1  (77)
˜
∗ =
µ 
∗
¶ 1−(1−)  (78)
respectively. Let us denote the long run population density with integrated labor
markets by ˆ. Using (77) and (78) in (76), we obtain
ˆ
∗ =
¡ 
∗
¢+(1−)(1−)(1−)(1−)¡∗

¢ 
1−
 (79)
This confirms comparative-static results. ¥
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This Online Appendix provides further details for the empirical evidence
for East Germany in the paper (data sources, discussions of construction of
the data, and robustness checks) as well as further numerical results. Section
1 relates to the migration data (Fig. 1 and Fig. 2 in the main text). Section
2 shows the evolution of variables in the model not displayed in Fig. 3 and
4 in the main text, based on the same experiments. Section 3 discusses the
wage data (Fig. 5 in the main text). Section 4 gives details on the empirical
rental rates for housing (Fig. 6 and 7 in the main text) and provides a number
of additional Figures. They are based on different sample selections to check
robustness. Moreover, we report the evolution of rental rates of housing ac-
cording to city size in addition to ”Bundeslaender” (states) and East Germany
as a whole.
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1 Migration Data
• Data sources
For the period 1991−1994: ‘Wanderungsdatenbank, Leibniz-Institut fu¨r La¨n-
derkunde’.
For the period 1995−2014: ‘Wanderungsstatistik - Statistische A¨mter des
Bundes und der La¨nder’, with the following exceptions where the data
comes from the ‘Statistische Landesa¨mter’: Brandenburg 1993 and 2014,
Mecklenburg-Hither Pomerania 2014, Saxony 1994, Saxony-Anhalt 2007
and 2014, Thuringia 1991-1993 and 2007-2014.
• The migration data set used for Fig. 1 and Fig. 2 in the main text is
based on net migration balances, taking into account all movements crossing
the border of administrative districts. Administrative districts correspond
to NUTS 3 units in the EUROSTAT typology for all five New Laender in
Germany. The districts in the New Laender were subject to numerous border
reforms between 1991 and 2014, reducing their number considerably. In order
to be able to compare the data over a period from 1991 to 2014, one territorial
status was chosen and reconstructed for the periods with differing district-
borders. The longest period not marked by big territorial reforms lasted from
1995 to 2006. Thus, we selected the territorial boundaries valid at that time.
For the periods before (1991-1994) and after (2007-2014), the municipalities
(corresponding to LAU2 units) were assigned to the districts to whom they
belonged during the referential period and their net migration balances were
added up to reconstruct the data at the district-level.
• Two former districts of Saxony-Anhalt are not included in the analysis:
Anhalt-Zerbst and Dessau. During the reforms of the districts’ borders in
2007 the urban municipality Dessau was merged with the urban municipality
Roßlau. Unfortunately, there is no data available distinguishing between the
former Dessau and the former Roßlau. It is therefore not possible to recon-
struct the district of Dessau for the time before 1995 and after 2013. In the
course of the reform, several municipalities from the newly formed district of
Dessau-Roßlau were attributed to Anhalt-Zerbst, rendering it impossible to
reconstruct this district as well. The municipalities which belonged to these
two districts are therefore not shown in the data.
2 Complementing Numerical Results
In Fig. A.1 and Fig. A.2, we display for the same experiments the evolution of
the variables in the model not displayed in Fig. 3 and Fig. 4 in the main text,
respectively.
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Figure A.1: Transitional dynamics for an initially capital-poor economy assuming
labor market integration at t=0 (solid lines) and assuming that labor markets remain
closed (dotted lines). Same parameter configuration as for Fig. 3 in the main text.
Figure A.2: Transitional dynamics for an economy that initially is capital-poor and
has low TFP levels assuming labor market integration at t=0 (solid lines) and assum-
ing that labor markets remain closed (dotted lines). Same parameter configuration
as for Fig. 4 in the main text.
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3 Wage Data
• Data source: “Entstehung, Verteilung und Verwendung des Bruttoinlandspro-
dukts in den La¨ndern der Bundesrepublik Deutschland 1991 bis 2015”, VGRdL
(http://www.vgrdl.de/VGRdL/tbls/).
• The real wage time series employed in Fig. 5 in the main text is based on
gross wages (i.e. earnings before taxes, social contributions and payments in
kind), nominal and real private household consumption and a consumption
deflator.
• The consumption deflator was calculated from nominal private household con-
sumption and real private household consumption. Real household consump-
tion is derived from nominal private household consumption and a chain index.
The current base year of the chain index is 2010. Nominal and real private
household consumption is measured in million Euros.
• Gross wages are measured per employee, including civil servants, interns and
trainees as well as part-time work in the main occupation.
• Fig. A.3 shows the evolution of real wages (in 2010 prices) in the five New
Laender separately and for East Germany as a whole (without Berlin). There
is a large increase in the 1990s that led to the (incomplete) convergence to the
West German wage level shown in Fig. 5. Real wages in the New Laender as
well as in West Germany changed little in the 2000s.
Figure A.3: Real wages per worker (in 2010 EUR) in the New Laender, 1991-2014.
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4 Rental Rates of Housing
4.1 Data and Estimation Method
• Data source: German Socio-Economic Panel Study (SOEP) v31 (http://dx.
doi.org/10.5684/soep.v31).1
• SOEP is a representative annual household panel survey that offers detailed
information on rental housing from the perspective of tenants. Because of
the panel structure of the data, we are able to control for time-invariant con-
founders at the tenancy level. The final data set consists of 107,514 private
households who live in rental apartments between 1984 and 2014 in West Ger-
many and 34,248 private households who live in rental apartments between
1990 and 2014 in East Germany.
• To get robust estimations, we exclude the upper and the lower 1% of the un-
conditional rent and apartment size distribution. The final analysis is therefore
restricted to apartments which
cost more than EUR 28,- (deflated) and less than EUR 1520,- (deflated),
are not smaller than 26 sqm and not larger than 159 sqm.
• In addition to presenting descriptive evidence, we constructed price measures
based on a standard hedonic pricing model that constructs a quality-adjusted
measure of rental payments.
• Tab. A.1 describes the variables used to construct the empirical measures for
the rental rates of housing. For categorical variables the reference category is
printed in bold and excluded from the regression analyses.
• We specify and estimate the hedonic pricing model of rental unit i in year t
by
(1) pHit =
k∑
j=1
βj · xjit +
N∑
R=1
T∑
t=1
γt,R · 1 (i ∈ SR) · 1 (i ∈ St) + ηi + uit,
where pHit denotes the rent (price for housing services) per square meter, xjit
are measures of apartment quality (see Tab A.1) that are indexed by j ∈
{1, . . . , k}, SR denotes the set of observations in region R ∈ {1, ..., N}, 1(i ∈
SR) is a dummy variable that equals one if rental unit i is located in region R,
St denotes the set of observations in period t, 1(i ∈ St) is a dummy variable
that equals one if rental unit i is observed in period t, ηi is a fixed effect for
rental unit i (included if and only if a rental unit is observed more than once),
and uit is the residual.
1For background information on SOEP, see Wagner, Gert G., Joachim R. Frick, and Ju¨rgen
Schupp (2007). The German Socio-Economic Panel Study (SOEP): Scope, Evolution and En-
hancements, Schmollers Jahrbuch - Journal of Contextual Economics 127, 139-169.
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• The estimated coefficients of the interaction terms, γt,R, can be interpreted as
the mean quality-adjusted price measure in region R and period t ∈ {1, ..., T}.
• The unadjusted and quality-adjusted measure of rental payments are in addi-
tion rescaled to get an index with the average rent in East Germany in 1990
as base value (= 100).
• For each quality measure with missing values, except size, we replace missing
values by zero and include an additional dummy variable coded one if the value
of the original variable is imputed (and zero otherwise). Results presented
under the label “Sample without rental units where not all quality indicators
are available” exclude observations with missings in apartment characteristics.
• Results presented under the label “Sample without rental units that are ob-
served only once” exclude tenancies with only one observation and control for
fixed effects (ηi) in the hedonic pricing model. Using rental unit fixed effects
addresses the possibility that unobserved and time-constant covariates are cor-
related with quality measures. In this case OLS estimators would be biased
leading to residuals which are not correctly calculated. By including rental
unit fixed effects, we are able to control for these unobserved time-invariant
confounders. We implement the rental unit fixed effects by calculating mean
values of each variable in the hedonic pricing model for each rental unit and
calculate for each observation the difference between the values of the original
variables and the mean values for each rental unit. Instead of the original
variables, we then use these demeaned variables.
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Table A.1: Variable List
Size
Size of an apartment measured in square meters.
Type of House
A categorical variable that identifies the type of building regarding the
number of rental units. Each category is represented in the regression
analysis by a dummy variable. The categories are
• 1-2 Family Detached House • 1-2 Family Nondetached House
• Apartment in 3-4 Unit Building • Apartment in 5-8 Unit Building
• Apartment in 9+ Unit Building • High-Rise Apartment Building
• Other Buildings
Residential Area
A categorical variable that identifies the type of residential area in which
the apartment is located. Each category is represented in the regression
analysis by a dummy variable. The categories are
• Residential Area Old • Residential Area New
• Mixed Area • Other Areas
Year of Construction
A categorical variable that identifies the year of construction. Each
category is represented in the regression analysis by a dummy variable.
The categories are
• Before 1918 • 1918 to 1948
• 1949 to 1971 • 1972 to 1980
• 1981 to 1990 • 1991 to 2000
• Since 2001
Apartment Condition
A categorical variable that measures the subjective valuation of the
apartment condition. Each category is represented in the regression
analysis by a dummy variable. The categories are
• In Good Condition • Partly in Need of Renovation
• In Need of Complete Renovation
<continued on next page>
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Table A.1: Variable List <continued>
Apartment Equipment
Each type of equipment is represented in the analysis by a dummy
variable that indicates its existence. The various equipment we control
for are
• Central Heating • Balcony or Terrace
• Basement • Garden
Reduced Payments
Two different types of reduced payments are identified in the regression
analysis by dummy variables. First, whether the apartment is subsi-
dized by the government and second, whether the apartment is offered
by the landlord at a reduced price because the landlord is either the
employer and thus the reduction in the rental price is an implicit earn-
ing or a relative of the tenant and thus the reduction in the rental price
is a gift.
Elapsed Tenure
Elapsed tenure of a tenancy measured in years.
4.2 Sample Sizes and Results
• We present three sets of results for the evolution of rental rates for housing
over time, distinguished by their level of aggregation to regional units.
– West Germany vs. East Germany; see Tab. A.2 for sample sizes per year.
Fig. A.4 shows the unadjusted price index based on the full sample.
Fig. A.5 shows the hedonic price index based on the full sample.
Fig. A.6 shows the unadjusted price index based on the sample without
rental units that are observed only once.
Fig. A.7 shows the hedonic price index based on the sample without
rental units that are observed only once; the regression includes rental
unit fixed effects.
Fig. A.8 shows the unadjusted price index based on the sample without
rental units where not all quality indicators are available.
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Fig. A.9 shows the hedonic price index based on the sample without
rental units where not all quality indicators are available.
– The five New Laender in East Germany plus Berlin East; see Tab. A.3
for sample sizes per year.
Fig. A.10 shows the unadjusted price index based on the full sample.
Fig. A.11 shows the hedonic price index based on the full sample.
Fig. A.12 shows the unadjusted price index based on the sample without
rental units that are observed only once.
Fig. A.13 shows the hedonic price index based on the sample without
rental units that are observed only once; the regression includes rental
unit fixed effects.
Fig. A.14 shows the unadjusted price index based on the sample without
rental units where not all quality indicators are available.
Fig. A.15 shows the hedonic price index based on the sample without
rental units where not all quality indicators are available.
– Cities according to four categories of population size: < 20,000 in-
habitants (< 20K), 20,000-100,000 inhabitants (20K to 100K), 100,000-
500,000 inhabitants (100K to 500K), > 500,000 inhabitants (> 500K);
see Tab. A.4 for sample sizes per year.
Fig. A.16 shows the unadjusted price index based on the full sample.
Fig. A.17 shows the hedonic price index based on the full sample.
Fig. A.18 shows the unadjusted price index based on the sample without
rental units that are observed only once.
Fig. A.19 shows the hedonic price index based on the sample without
rental units that are observed only once; the regression includes rental
unit fixed effects.
Fig. A.20 shows the unadjusted price index based on the sample without
rental units where not all quality indicators are available.
Fig. A.21 shows the hedonic price index based on the sample without
rental units where not all quality indicators are available.
• Fig. 6 in the main text shows the rental rate of housing for the full sample
without controlling for quality indicators of the apartment (i.e. Fig. 6 is purely
descriptive). It corresponds to Fig. A.4.
• Fig. 7 in the main text shows the quality-adjusted rents for the New Laender
including rental unit fixed effects (“Sample without rental units that are ob-
served only once”, i.e. tenancies with only one observation are excluded). It
corresponds to Fig. A.13.
• All results on the evolution of rental payments in East German regional units
basically suggest the same pattern. Rental payments per square meter were
gradually increasing in the 1990s approximately by 500-600 percent and were
quite stagnant thereafter.
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4.2.1 Regional Unit: East and West Germany
Table A.2: Sample Size per Year
West Germany East Germany
Survey Year Full W/o
One-Obs.
Tenancies
W/o
Covariate
Missings
Full W/o
One-Obs.
Tenancies
W/o
Covariate
Missings
1984 3624 2863 0 0 0 0
1985 3199 3101 0 0 0 0
1986 2992 2895 2677 0 0 0
1987 2946 2842 2596 0 0 0
1988 2797 2725 2474 0 0 0
1989 2726 2669 2390 0 0 0
1990 2656 2600 2286 606 508 5
1991 2669 2595 2373 497 475 33
1992 2692 2608 2366 1286 1187 93
1993 2693 2617 2362 1246 1223 79
1994 2652 2564 2330 1218 1195 157
1995 2833 2695 2421 1182 1152 347
1996 2755 2655 2453 1172 1133 431
1997 2669 2560 2356 1144 1101 490
1998 3014 2770 2828 1196 1135 1101
1999 2826 2710 2687 1162 1119 1089
2000 4795 4075 4511 1787 1559 1681
2001 4297 4115 4049 1624 1574 1531
2002 4182 3968 3904 1605 1539 1506
2003 3996 3825 3200 1572 1518 1296
2004 3891 3712 2806 1524 1480 1176
2005 3780 3581 2619 1468 1421 1121
2006 4083 3759 2790 1587 1503 1180
2007 3775 3591 2954 1492 1445 1228
2008 3483 3344 3193 1429 1383 1329
2009 3235 3085 2951 1351 1313 1261
2010 2969 2860 2690 1245 1212 1163
2011 3956 3480 3609 1577 1469 1465
2012 3989 3713 3654 1622 1547 1517
<continued on next page>
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Table A.2: Sample Size per Year <continued>
West Germany East Germany
Survey Year Full W/o
One-Obs.
Tenancies
W/o
Covariate
Missings
Full W/o
One-Obs.
Tenancies
W/o
Covariate
Missings
2013 5416 4227 4856 1665 1548 1530
2014 5924 3636 4784 1991 1351 1638
Total 107514 98440 87169 34248 32090 24447
Note: The column labeled ”Full” refers to the full sample. The columns labeled ”W/o One-Obs.Tenancies”
and ”W/o Covariate Missings” refer to the samples without tenancies with only one observation and without
covariate missings, respectively. Source: SOEP V31 and authors’ calculations.
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4.2.1.1 Full sample
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Figure A.4: Unadjusted Price Index Figure A.5: Hedonic Price Index
4.2.1.2 Sample without rental units that are observed only once
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Figure A.6: Unadjusted Price Index Figure A.7: Hedonic Price Index
4.2.1.3 Sample without rental units where not all quality indicators are
available
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Figure A.8: Unadjusted Price Index Figure A.9: Hedonic Price Index
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4.2.2.1 Full sample
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Figure A.10: Unadjusted Price Index Figure A.11: Hedonic Price Index
4.2.2.2 Sample without rental units that are observed only once
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Figure A.12: Unadjusted Price Index Figure A.13: Hedonic Price Index
4.2.2.3 Sample without rental units where not all quality indicators are
available
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Figure A.14: Unadjusted Price Index Figure A.15: Hedonic Price Index
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4.2.3.1 Full sample
100
200
300
400
500
600
700
1984 1988 1992 1996 2000 2004 2008 2012
Year
>= 500K 100K to 500K
20K to 100K < 20K
100
200
300
400
500
600
1984 1988 1992 1996 2000 2004 2008 2012
Year
>= 500K 100K to 500K
20K to 100K < 20K
Figure A.16: Unadjusted Price Index Figure A.17: Hedonic Price Index
4.2.3.2 Sample without rental units that are observed only once
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Figure A.18: Unadjusted Price Index Figure A.19: Hedonic Price Index
4.2.3.3 Sample without rental units where not all quality indicators are
available
100
200
300
400
500
600
700
800
900
1984 1988 1992 1996 2000 2004 2008 2012
Year
>= 500K 100K to 500K
20K to 100K < 20K
100
200
300
400
500
600
1984 1988 1992 1996 2000 2004 2008 2012
Year
>= 500K 100K to 500K
20K to 100K < 20K
Figure A.20: Unadjusted Price Index Figure A.21: Hedonic Price Index
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